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ESSAY REVIEW
TURMOIL AND TENACITY:
THE ROAD TO THE UNITY ACCORD
In 1989 A fairly thick volume entitled Turmoil and Tenacity: Zimbabwe 
1890-1990, edited by the former State President of Zimbabwe, was pub­
lished.1 This book is unique in many ways. Besides the fact that it was 
edited by a former State President now turned academic,2 the contributions 
are written by an assortment of people from many professions — historians, 
lawyers, bureaucrats, political scientists, civil-rights activists — and some 
of Zimbabwe’s high-ranking politicians such as ZANU(PF) Politburo 
members Nathan Shamuyarira, Didymus Mutasa and Emmerson Mnanga- 
gwa. Even one of Zimbabwe’s Vice-Presidents, Joshua Nkomo, and President 
Robert Mugabe himself contributed to it. This adds to the curiosity value 
of the book, if not to its academic weight. In all, fifteen contributors were 
involved. They were chosen for their familiarity with their subject — 
through their intimate involvement in Zimbabwean politics, or because of 
the research they had carried out in their respective areas of interest, or 
both.
The chapters in this book are uneven in size and quality, adding to 
variety but also to annoyance. Four chapters are very short, ranging from 
3 to 7 pages; eight are slightly longer, ranging from 12 to 17 pages; another 
four chapters have between 25 and 35 pages; one chapter has 46 pages, 
and the longest has 66 pages. Five chapters do not have footnotes, twelve 
have endnotes, while two cite references within the text. The editor of this 
volume should have given the authors guidance on both these issues of 
length and preferred referencing system. My suspicion is that he did in 
fact do so, but, as is often the case when an assortment of people with 
varied backgrounds are involved in an assignment, there are bound to be 
some oversights and misreading of instructions. This confusion spoils an 
otherwise worthwhile effort, several chapters of which, particularly those 
by academics, could be developed into book-length manuscripts.
Turmoil and Tenacity is both an academic and political study. It could 
not have been otherwise given its inspiration and the occupations of its 
contributors. The project was inspired by the signing of the Unity Accord 
between ZANU(PF) and PF-ZAPU on 22 December 1987, which ended the 
second part of a ‘two-fold’ struggle which, in Banana’s words, was firstly ‘a 
struggle against a common enemy’, and secondly, an ‘internal struggle for 
national unity’ (p. 1).
In his contribution, ‘An overview of the struggle for unity and indepen­
dence’ (pp. 13-24), Nathan Shamuyarira reports on various efforts to 
achieve unity in the nationalist movement when it faced a common enemy.
1 C. S. Banana (ed.), Turmoil and Tenacity: Zimbabwe, 1890-1990 (Harare, College 
Press, 1989), 376 pp., ISBN 0-86925-992-X, Z$35,95.
2 Revd Banana was President of Zimbabwe from 1980 to 1987. He is currently Honorary 
Professor of Religion and Philosophy at the University of Zimbabwe.
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He claims that the ‘first united front achieved was in 1896, during the first 
Chimurenga War’ against White settlers (p. 13). Having made this point 
Shamuyarira then catalogues successive, unsuccessful efforts for unity, 
most of them during the liberation struggle in the 1970s. These efforts 
culminated in the December 1987 Unity Accord which he describes as ‘the 
final and successful effort’ to unite ZANU and ZAPU after ZANU(PF) had 
been ‘finally confirmed as the dominant political party’ (p. 23). Shamuyarira 
does not offer any explanation as to why the unity efforts succeeded only 
in 1987. He implies that unity was finally achieved because the performance 
of ZANU(PF) in successive elections left no doubt of its dominance. This, 
as we shall see later, is a false impression.
Misheck Sibanda contributes a study on ‘Early foundations of African 
nationalism’ (pp. 25-49). It offers an analysis of ‘pre-colonial social 
formations’, mentioning the strong state systems of the Munhumutapa 
and Changamire which, by the middle of the nineteenth century, had 
‘disintegrated due to natural internecine conflicts and external inter­
ferences’ (p. 25). His interpretation of early Zimbabwean history avoids 
the trap of idolizing pre-colonial history as a classless, and, therefore, 
conflict-free society. Although he does not elaborate the point, he concedes 
that the Munhumutapa and Changamire states decayed because of these 
‘natural internecine conflicts’. The ‘external interference’ referred to is 
not the advent of the colonial powers but the arrival of the Nguni groups 
that invaded Shona societies in the early nineteenth century and resulted 
in the dominance of the class-structured Ndebele system over the Shona 
(pp. 28-9). The Ndebele and Shangaan groups ‘exacted tributes and raided 
the Shona for food and cattle’ — in many ways the same items that the 
White settlers ‘exacted’ and ‘raided for’ later in the century. Sibanda goes 
on to chronicle the establishment of the capitalist political economy in 
1890 up to the outbreak of the Second World War and shows the dramatic 
and tragic, if gradual, ‘proletarianization’ and ‘marginalization’ of the African 
people during this period. Sibanda’s contribution ends with an appraisal 
of the early African struggles against unjust colonial rule during the period 
1890 to 1957, beginning with the ‘well-documented’ Ndebele and Shona 
uprising of 1896-7, which ‘Zimbabweans have come to regard as the first 
war of liberation or Chimurenga’ (p. 35).
Sibanda, like many others in this book (Banana, Shamuyarira and 
Mugabe, for example), notes that this first Chimurenga was ‘countrywide’ 
and involved the participation of both ‘the Ndebele and Shona groups’. 
However, also like the others, he avoids mentioning that in the 1890s the 
Ndebele and the Shona ‘armies’ fought separately — as indeed, ZIPRA and 
ZANLA forces would fight separately in the second Chimurenga of the 
1970s. There was no Ndebele-Shona joint military command in the first 
Chimurenga. Even if it had existed, I doubt if it could have escaped the fate 
of the short-lived Zimbabwe People’s Army (ZIPA) of the late 1970s.:i I 
would argue that, had the first Chimurenga succeeded, the Ndebele and 
the Shona armies would have fought each other afterwards to settle an 
earlier, pre-colonial, score — as indeed they did between 1982 and 1987 in
:1 See E. Mnangagwa, ‘The formation of the Zimbabwe People’s Army: ZIPA’, pp. 143-6.
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Matabeleland after the success of the second Chimurenga. No matter how 
thoroughly we search, the Unity Accord of 1987 has no precedent. It 
stands on its own, itself setting a precedent.
The chapter entitled ‘The nationalist struggle, 1957-1962’ by Ngwabi 
Bhebe (pp. 50-115) is the longest chapter in the book, being 66 pages long. 
At first glance its length is threatening but I found Bhebe’s contribution 
the most engaging, enjoyable and refreshing of all. Bhebe relates the story 
of this period in a lively and lucid manner which recreates the past for 
those Zimbabweans who, like myself, remember that time.
Bhebe begins with a well-defined thesis, to show how the nationalist 
movement ‘by exploiting African rural and urban grievances, grew rapidly 
until within five years it had engulfed the whole country’. The groundwork 
achieved during this early period, argues Bhebe, ‘did facilitate the launching 
of the armed struggle’ (p. 50). He proves this claim in 65 pages of well- 
documented research, citing archival sources and key informant interviews, 
with 134 footnotes.
Judith Todd disposes of the 90 years of ‘White policy and politics: 
1890-1980’ in 7 pages with 2 footnotes (pp. 116-22). She swiftly makes the 
point that White politics evolved through ‘four distinct stages’ before 
African majority rule: British South Africa Company rule; responsible 
government; federation; and the pariah state and the civil war which 
finally destroyed White political power (p. 117). She makes the point that 
it was because the ‘only possible umpire between white power and black 
realities’ — Britain — ‘never desired to become directly involved’, and, in 
fact, wanted to ‘extricate itself from colonial involvement’, that the civil 
war occurred (p. 120). Thus Todd seems to be saying that, had the ‘only 
possible umpire’ wanted to become directly involved, the civil war might 
have been averted. She might have lengthened her chapter by elaborating 
on this thesis and explaining why such a scenario did not occur. Some 
would argue, however, that, to the contrary, the ‘only possible umpire’ 
was inextricably involved, but on the side of the Whites.4 Moreover, as 
Bhebe’s contribution shows, the nationalist’s swords were being sharp­
ened as far back as the 1950s, independent of the British umpire.
Anthony Chennells’s chapter, ‘White Rhodesian nationalism: The 
mistaken years’ (pp. 123-39), compensates for Todd’s piece on the same 
subject; his chapter is one of the better-written ones. His argument is that 
there was a ‘nascent nationalism’ in White Rhodesia which developed into 
the ‘assertion of the unilateral declaration of independence’ in 1965 (p. 
123-4). The Rhodesians ‘proclaimed that they had a separate identity to 
that of other white Southern Africans’, and on this claim rested White 
Rhodesian nationalism (pp. 128).5 He documents this self-perception 
convincingly. As to what became of this ‘nascent nationalism’ after Black 
majority rule in 1980, Chennells ends on a happy note stating that White 
Rhodesians ‘became part’ of the Zimbabwe nation. White nationalism, he 
says, ‘has been transformed into a Zimbabwean patriotism’ (p. 128).
' This is part of the ‘Kith-and-kin’ thesis.
5 L. Bowman’s Politics in R hodesia : While Power in a  B lack Stale (Cambridge, Harvard 
Univ. Press, 1973) also argues along these lines.
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I would be cautious in asserting that White Rhodesian nationalism, 
which took more than three-quarters of a century to develop, could be 
transformed into a Zimbabwean patriotism in only seven years of Black 
rule. In fact, by 1985 it had not been transformed at all — given the White 
vote for Ian Smith’s CAZ Party (formerly the Rhodesia Front). Mugabe thus 
lambasted the Whites in 1985 saying that their vote had ‘proven that they 
have not repented in any way’.6 7Maybe it is more true to say most Whites 
exhibit the usual civility to political authority. On the patriotism scale, we 
do not know how many Whites volunteered to fight ‘RENAMO bandits’. 
But this is a question we could also ask about civilian Black Zimbabweans.
Emmerson Mnangagwa wrote the two shortest chapters, one on the 
short-lived Frolizi, T he formation of the Front for the Liberation of Zimbabwe: 
Frolizi’ (pp. 140-2), and the other on the equally short-lived ZIPA, ‘The 
formation of the Zimbabwe People’s Army: ZIPA’ (pp. 143-6). He compensates 
for this brevity by a third, longer contribution of 17 pages in which he gives 
a descriptive analysis of ‘Post-independence Zimbabwe: 1980-1987’ (pp. 
225-41). In the three pieces, Mnangagwa principally chronicles events. One 
cannot fault him on accuracy, nor on interpretation on the rare occasions 
when he offers one. For instance, in explaining why ZANU(PF) and PF-ZAPU 
contested the 1980 elections separately, he has this to say:
Whatever explanations may be offered, the true and plausible explanation should 
be found in the history of the struggle itself. One of the most burning and outstand­
ing issues . . .  was that of leadership and relative popularity of each party. It was the 
earnest feeling of many . . . that the question of party leadership could only be 
decided upon and resolved by the masses of Zimbabwe . . .  at home (p. 227).
Yet it was the ‘earnest’ feeling of many others (Nkomo and the late 
ZANLA commander, Josiah Tongogara, for instance) that ZANU and ZAPU 
should have contested the Independence election together so as to avoid 
future civil strife. In his book, Nkomo: The Story o f  my Life,1 Nkomo puts 
forward the argument that he wanted the parties to run jointly as the 
Patriotic Front, precisely because he foresaw a possible civil war in 
Zimbabwe (whether started by ZIPRA or by ZANLA). As it turned out, 
there was civil war in Matabeleland. This conflict occupies a large portion 
of Mnangagwa’s contribution to this book.
It is also true that some ZANU(PF) strategists may have had a real fear 
of eventually losing the leadership if they had campaigned jointly with 
ZAPU. They therefore risked the worst scenario — the conflict that came 
as Nkomo had predicted and as they had anticipated. Those intimately 
involved with the ‘goings on’ in the liberation struggle would have known 
the saying ‘Sinjonjo tam ba wakachenjera' [if you wish to participate in a 
seductive dance you must be very careful]. This, in the politics of the time, 
meant: ‘Don’t trust your partner’s [the other political party’s] intentions!’ 
The question of unity, therefore, as Mnangagwa explains, hinged on the
6 Quoted by M. Sithole, T h e  general elections 1979-85’, in I. Mandaza (ed.), Zim babw e: 
The Political Economy o f  Transition 1980-1986 (Dakar, CODESRIA, 1986), 92.
7 J. M. Nkomo, N kom o: The Story o f  my Life (London, Methuen, 1984).
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leadership question. This is confirmed in subsequent chapters of this 
book, particularly those by Chiwewe, Mutasa and Mugabe. It would seem 
that, in the pursuit of power, principles take a back seat.
A former political scientist, now a corporate executive, Ariston 
Chambati, uses his earlier background and experience to analyse Bishop 
Muzorewa’s African National Council (ANC). He covers the period 1971 to 
1979, describing the formation of the ANC in 1971 to oppose the Pearce 
Commission and the circumstances that led to Muzorewa being asked to 
be the ANC leader. He describes most lucidly the conflicts within the ANC 
over the negotiations with Ian Smith between 1972 and 1974, as well as the 
conflicts between the ANC and ZAPU in 1975 and 1976, and between the 
parties involved in the internal settlement and the Patriotic Front from 
1976 to 1979.
Chambati suggests that Muzorewa was a ‘caretaker’ leader who 
performed rather well during the time that he himself believed he was 
that. But Muzorewa began making mistakes when he started acting 
politician. ‘Apparently’, writes Chambati, ‘Abel Muzorewa lost sight of the 
fact that he was merely a caretaker leader’ (p. 156). While it could be 
argued that Muzorewa played a positive role only during the early stages 
of his political career, I believe that, by and large, he played a positive role 
throughout. For example, when ZANU and ZAPU leaders could not agree 
on a leader of the umbrella ANC in December 1974, they decided on 
Muzorewa. And, as some observers have suggested, the Lancaster House 
settlement would not have occurred or succeeded without a weak, albeit 
naive man leading the Salisbury delegation.8 It was necessary, therefore, 
to have a transitional man between Smith and Mugabe. In a way, and in 
that sense, the Bishop was God-sent.
The contribution by Shephard Nzombe traces ‘Negotiations with the 
British’ from the 1961 Southern Rhodesia constitutional conference (chaired 
by Duncan Sandys) to the 1979 Southern Rhodesia ‘Lancaster House’ 
constitutional conference (chaired by Lord Carrington) (pp. 162-96). The 
minor conferences in between are outlined and their failure explained. 
Greater detail is naturally reserved for the negotiations at Lancaster House. 
Nzombe’s emphasis is on the constitutional developments towards 
democracy. In fact, an alternative title for his chapter could be ‘Zimbabwe 
in search of a democratic constitutional order’. He concludes with some 
thoughts on ‘post-Independence constitutional changes’. One of the 
changes he anticipated was that the Senate would be abolished to make 
way for an enlarged unicameral Parliament. He welcomed this impending 
development (which has since taken place) stating ‘not much tears will be 
shed when it is finally done away with’ (p. 195).
However, I shed tears because a case can now be made for a Senate. 
An upper house will be needed in the future even more than it was in the 
past. There are many elderly politicians in Zimbabwe and there will 
definitely be more of them in the future. What does a nation do with its
8 S. Stedman, in his P eacem aking  in Civil War: International M ediation in Zimbabwe, 1974- 
1980 (Boulder, Lynne Rienner, 1991), 239, suggests that the Lancaster House settlement would 
have been different had Smith led the Salisbury delegation.
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‘old Bolsheviks’ when their spirits are willing but their bodies and minds 
are not? Their dignity and experience is quite useful in nation building but 
they should not remain in demanding and exacting executive cabinet 
posts. Their collective wisdom could be utilized more wisely and usefully 
in other areas. The Senate could be one such arena.
Canaan Banana’s own chapter on ‘The role of the church in the 
struggle for liberation in Zimbabwe’ (pp. 197-210), attempts to situate the 
contribution of the various Christian personalities and denominations in 
the liberation effort from the very beginning of Zimbabwe’s colonization 
to its very end. He also suggests the role that the church can play in the 
post-Independence period. He shows how the Christian church was divided 
on the question of UDI in the mid-1960s and how the use of violence as an 
instrument for liberation remained a contentious issue in the church 
throughout the war in the 1970s. The Catholic Commission for Justice and 
Peace is correctly singled out for praise for their ‘critique of the Rhodesia 
minority regime’ — a critique which was ‘radical and founded on a policy 
of non-cooperation’ (p. 205).
The Church’s role in education and health care throughout the colonial 
era is similarly recognized. For the future role of the Church, Banana singles 
out the ‘land question’ which he acknowledges as still ‘a hot potato—  10 
years after independence’. ‘The Church cannot afford to keep aloof’ from the 
land question, says Banana, as it is itself a ‘big land owner’ (p. 209).
One striking omission in Banana’s contribution is that nowhere does 
he mention the Church’s contribution to the spiritual and ethical values of 
the liberation movement. Where mention is made, it is indirect and 
peripheral. The Church is viewed and treated as a purely socio-political 
entity and its spiritual role is down-played, if it is mentioned at all. Yet this 
is the raison d ’etre of the Christian Church as a religious entity. What 
ethical values did the Church inculcate in the ‘comrades’ during the war of 
liberation? Banana should comment on this, even if the Church had no 
influence in this way. And if it did not, this should be explained. I suspect 
that the Church, in its pursuit of ‘liberation theology’ (relevant as this may 
be), did in fact fail to instil its own moral code in the guerrillas. With the 
current ethical and value crisis in Zimbabwe’s social and cultural milieu, 
one is tempted to say to the Church: ‘Don’t forget religion!’
The issue of ‘Education with production before and after independence’ 
is dealt with by Fay Chung (pp. 211-24). She starts her contribution by 
stating that ‘Land and education were key issues during the liberation 
struggle’. Certainly, land had been taken away from the African, but had 
education been? She argues that it was, inter alia, because ‘access to 
education was extremely limited for blacks’ that Africans took up arms 
against the colonial settler regime (p. 211). ZANU evolved the ‘theory and 
policy of education with production’ during the liberation struggle. The 
war situation necessitated a system of self-reliance. It is this experience 
and philosophy that became the foundation of the Zimbabwe Foundation 
for Education with Production (ZIMFEP) established shortly after Inde­
pendence. ‘Education with production is a key concept both in terms of 
the class struggle and in terms of the practical solution of the main 
problem which faces Zimbabwe today’, says Chung (p. 223).
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Chung does not mention the contribution made by ZAPU/ZIPRA 
comrades to the philosophy and practice of ‘education with production’. 
Most of the experiences she recounts relate to ZANLA. What was the 
philosophy and practice of their partner in the struggle? For a contribution 
to a volume inspired by and dedicated to the unity of ZANU(PF) and ZAPU, 
this oversight is unfortunate.
The negotiations that led to the Unity Accord are the subject of 
Willard Chiwewe’s contribution, ‘Unity negotiations’ (pp. 242-87). Chiwewe 
attended most of the ‘unity meetings’ that took place between 1985 and 
1987. His 46-page contribution is mainly a reproduction of the minutes of 
those meetings. Although he gives an interpretation here and there, he is 
basically reporting what happened at every one of these meetings over 
two years. Chiwewe’s chapter is, therefore, a unique contribution in that it 
is not an analysis of issues raised in the minutes, but is a presentation of 
those minutes in a readable and sequential form for those who care to 
analyse the issues contained therein. With this caveat, Chiwewe’s chapter 
is excellently written with useful insights here and there.9 *
After reading Chiwewe’s excellent minutes and the text of the Unity 
Accord that concludes the chapter, the painful question in the reader’s 
mind is: Was the agreement not possible in 1980? Joshua Nkomo would 
probably answer ‘Yes, if ZANU and ZAPU had contested the elections 
jointly’. But Mugabe would probably argue that in fact he had offered 
ZAPU essentially similar terms in 1980 when he formed a government of 
national unity, but ZAPU turned them down and accepted them in 1987 
only after an armed conflict. In a contribution elsewhere on this issue I 
made the following observation:
However, with an arsenal of arms buried in various places in Matabeleland, and a 
cadre of young men aching to fight, ZAPU had not only the will, but also the 
capacity to test both Mugabe’s will to rule and ZANU’s capacity to survive. Post­
independence dissident activity then must be seen in terms of this decisive test. It 
is a test that those intimately connected with the development of the liberation 
struggle could see coming, and that must fade away as Mugabe’s will and ZANU’s 
capacity are effectively demonstrated."’
The contribution by Didymus Mutasa, ‘The signing of the unity accord: 
A step forward in Zimbabwe’s national political development’ (pp. 288- 
304), is useful in that it emphasizes the policy direction of the country 
with regard to the one-party state and socialist ideology after the Unity 
Accord. Mutasa celebrates the fact that the new party is ‘dedicated to 
creating a socialist society’ that is guided by Marxist-Leninist principles 
(p. 289). He is less inhibited than others in explaining why the ruling party 
desired unity. ‘The ruling party’, Mutasa writes, ‘desired national unity so 
as to finally establish a one-party state’ (p. 290). As if to emphasize the
9 See p. 269 for Chiwewe’s insightful interpretation of misperceptions.
111 M. Sithole, ‘Zimbabwe: In search of a stable democracy’, in L. Diamond eta l., D em ocracy  
in D eveloping Countries: Africa (Boulder, Lynne Reinner, 1988), 240. This is a test that Mugabe 
and ZANU have already passed.
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same point he repeats ‘Unity was necessary for ZANU(PF) to achieve the 
long cherished goal of a one-party state’ (p. 293). One would have thought 
that the one-party state was desirable for national unity, but unity, for 
Mutasa, was necessary for the establishment of the one-party state.
Mutasa ends his contribution with an incorrect and rather unfortunate 
observation. ‘But what must always be borne in mind’, he says, ‘is that 
unity was . . .  a compromise between the two parties . . .  and not the defeat 
or victory of one party over the other’ (p. 298). It is an ‘incorrect 
observation’ because, as is clear from Chiwewe’s minutes, no compromise 
was either implied or suggested by ZANU(PF) negotiators, it is an 
‘unfortunate observation’ because it was not necessary for Mutasa to 
make this obviously incorrect statement. Even a cursory look at the terms 
of the Unity Accord (let alone the Chiwewe minutes) gives one the im­
pression that the document spells out terms of surrender and not com­
promise. Nowhere in the eleven-point agreement does Nkomo’s name 
appear, but Mugabe’s appears three times. (Nkomo’s name only appears 
as a signatory to the document.) Nkomo should be praised for the bitter 
pill he swallowed because his humility brought peace to Matableleland. 
Eight of the eleven points are pregnant with victorious Mugabe’s ideas. 
Where mention is made of PF-ZAPU it is either to indicate that henceforth 
it shall be called ZANU(PF) or that its leadership shall take ‘immediate 
vigorous steps to help eliminate and end the insecurity and violence 
prevalent in Matabeleland’ (p. 285-6).
The contribution by Nkomo himself in this volume is, to say the least, 
symbolic. His 5-page offering, ‘The significance of national unity and the 
future’ (p. 300-4) is mainly a restatement of the positions on unity that PF- 
ZAPU adopted at its 1984 Congress and in subsequent Central Committee 
statements. Like many others, he praises the ‘united efforts’ to resist 
‘colonial intrusion’ in the 1890s. He does, however, make an interesting 
and significant observation about the 1963 split:
The formation o f . . . ZANU in 1963 by Ndabaningi Sithole and some former ZAPU 
leaders should not be viewed as a breakaway. ZANU could have marginally differed 
with ZAPU, not with regard to the armed struggle but perhaps in the style of 
achieving the same objective (p. 301).
How else can we view this split, if not as a ‘breakaway’? Are we to view 
the above in terms of a Maoist conception of ‘antagonistic’ and ‘non- 
antagonistic’ contradictions? Mao would call ‘marginal differences’ non- 
antagonistic and, therefore, would agree with Nkomo’s description of ZANU 
as ‘not a breakaway’ if the differences between ZAPU and ZANU were marginal.
But the substantive issue was that of commitment to the armed struggle. 
The argument is often made that the split occurred on the issue of the 
armed struggle. Ngwabi Bhebe’s contribution in this book is persuasive in 
making the point which Nkomo tries to make. ZAPU was preparing for war 
when the split occurred. This point is also most articulately argued by 
Cain Mathema.11 It all boils down to being ‘more’ or ‘less’ committed — the
11 N. C. G. Mathema, ‘The Long and Painful Road to ZANU(PF)-PF-ZAPU Unity’ (Harare, 
unpubl., 1988).
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question of non-antagonistic contradictions. But, do non-antagonistic 
contradictions matter? They do, otherwise the conflict in Matabeleland 
does not make sense.
Welshman Ncube’s contribution, ‘The post-unity period: Developments, 
benefits and problems’ (pp. 305-35), analyses ‘developments, benefits and 
problems’ experienced since the Unity Accord. These developments are: the 
elimination of banditry in Matabeleland: the role of students and the press in 
exposing the Willowgate scandal; the reactions of the masses to the political 
system after Willowgate and other scandals; the quality of parliamentary 
debates after the Unity Accord; problems that were experienced during the 
new ZANU(PF)’s integration exercise; the formation, impact of and reactions 
to the Zimbabwe Unity Movement (ZUM) in 1989; and the closure of the 
University in October 1989. These ‘post-unity’ developments, says Ncube, 
‘have all, in one way or another, provided a barometer with which to 
measure the practice of “democracy” in Zimbabwe’ (p. 329).
The major thesis in Ncube’s contribution is that unity provided space 
for democratic expression in Zimbabwe: ‘In this context, unity has provided 
the basis for the democratic expression of views’. Thus he laments the 
formation of ZUM in 1989 which, he writes, ‘appears to have laid the basis 
for a return to pre-unity politics of division and animosity which hindered 
the emergence and development of critical democratic values’ (ibid.). 
What an eloquent justification for a one-party state! The fact is that Ncube 
is looking at politicians who, like their followers, are still learning to walk 
in the democratic way. Ncube coins an instructive phrase about this 
phenomenon, calling it ‘the politics of over-reaction’ (p. 324). I believe that 
both the leader and the follower must move away and not towards the 
politics of over-reaction. That another political party is formed should not 
limit democratic expression but, rather, should be viewed as an expression 
of democracy.
Robert Mugabe’s contribution, ‘The Unity Accord: Its promise for the 
future’ (pp. 336-59), concludes the book. With a Marxist flair the author 
explains the ‘tribal character’ of both ZANU and ZAPU in terms of feudal 
‘social formations’ and ‘loyalties’ which he claims to be a thing of the past 
(p. 337-8). The ZANU(PF) unity is presumably based on the new ‘class 
character’ of both ZANU and ZAPU in terms of contemporary ‘non-feudal’ 
social formations and loyalties. However, while Marxist explanations are 
useful tools for analysis, they must not be used to explain away enduring 
social problems. The reason why politicized ethnicity continues in 
contemporary society is as old as politics itself. Ethnicity or tribalism is 
a political resource at the disposal of contemporary political gladiators in 
power contests.12
Mugabe shares Mnangagwa’s perception of why unity was a problem 
for such a long time. He says that the ‘leadership issue was the problem’ 
(p. 339). As a result the two parties contested the 1980 elections separately. 
When ZANU(PF) won in 1980 the leadership problem was resolved. This 
explanation is as logical as it is simple. The ultimate issue in politics is that
12 See M. Sithole, ‘The salience of ethnicity in African politics: The case of Zimbabwe, 
Journal o f  Asian and African Studies (1985), XX, 187-90.
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of leadership: who tells whom what to do and when to do it. Ndabaningi 
Sithole, himself a victim of the power struggles of the 1970s, succinctly 
defined the relationship between power and politics thus: ‘Politics and the 
pursuit of power are inseparable.’13
Mugabe’s contribution also attempts a class analysis of ZANU(PF) in 
which he sees three categories of interest groups according to their 
occupation. But he does not tell us which category controls and directs 
ZANU(PF), though he tasks ‘intellectuals and students’ with providing the 
‘urban and farm workers’ and ‘the subsistence farmers and entrepreneurs’ 
with a ‘revolutionary consciousness of themselves as a class’ (p. 345).14 
Mugabe prefers a socialist economy and a one-party political system. He 
sees Zimbabwe as having embarked on the road to socialism at Indepen­
dence and he forecasts that Zimbabwe will have reached the millennium 
in thirty years after Independence, at the very latest. ‘The process of 
transition to socialism began in the period soon after Independence’, he 
says, ‘and may take several years to complete, even a whole generation’ 
(p. 347). Apropos the one-party state, Mugabe shares the enthusiasm and 
optimism of Didymus Mutasa, although with more graphic expression. 
‘We believe’, he writes, ‘Zimbabwe’s future is better guaranteed under 
one, single, monolithic and gigantic political party’ (p. 355).15 16
Finally, it should be remembered that Turmoil and Tenacity was an 
inspiration of the moment. It could not have been otherwise, inspired as it 
was by the momentous signing of the Unity Accord that Zimbabwe had 
strived and waited for since the 1890s. Nothing comparable has been 
written so far. Victor de Waal’s The Politics o f  Reconciliation: Z im babw e’s 
First D ecad e'6 comes closest, but it is only one man’s view, though he 
confirms a great deal of what is written in Turmoil and Tenacity. Moreover, 
de Waal is an outsider looking in, a source of both strength and weakness. 
The two books should be read jointly.
There are many insights as well as oversights in Turmoil and Tenacity. 
Many of the oversights were, however, probably due more to the excitement 
of the moment than to the authors’ lack of ability or insight. Therefore, 
this book must be recommended both for the insight and oversight that it 
reveals. But in the future, the oversights might result in more turmoil than 
tenacity.
University o f  Zimbabwe M. Sitho le
13 Quoted in W. Walker, The B ea r  Next Door: The Soviet Threat to the West’s Lifeline in 
Africa (London, Foreign Affairs Publishing Company, 1978), 38.
11 The irony is that students and intellectuals at the University of Zimbabwe and elsewhere 
have maintained less than cordial relations with the ruling party since 1989 and relations have 
worsened since the University of Zimbabwe Amendment Act (No. 9 of 1991) restricted ‘academic 
freedom’.
15 The idea of the one-party state in Zimbabwe seemed to be very unpopular. See essays in 
I. Mandaza and L. Sachikonye (eds.), The One-party State and D em ocracy: The Zim babwe 
D ebate  (Harare, SAPES, 1991).
16 V. de Waal, The Politics o f  R econciliation: Z im babw e’s First D ecade  (London, Hurst and 
Company, 1990).
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